The electric power industry has been deregulated in many places. It is believed that an electricity market can be operated fairly and efficiently and that such a market can ensure a reliable supply of electricity. However, large-scale outages occurred where the electricity markets were in operation. Another problem is that the market signals failed to facilitate proper capacity additions. Simulations based on detailed model of generation capacity growth in (1) indicate that deregulation is a driver of the undesirable boom and bust cycle of power plant additions. For another example, no one could make major capacity additions to relieve the congestion of transmission lines into the New York City area. It is time to critically reevaluate the fundamental premises for deregulation of the electric power industry.
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In this research, the authors construct a simple model to represent wholesale electricity market with highly congested network. The model is developed by simplifying the power system and market in New York ISO based on available data of New York ISO in 2004 with some estimation. The model consists of two different generation mix areas: NYC (represents New York City and Long Island) and ROS (represents Rest of State) connected with a congested line. The imported power from adjacent areas (ROW: Rest of World) are modeled by injected power into each area. Market player consists of NYC Generator, NYC Load, ROS Generator, ROS Load and Transmission Owner (TO). Based on the simplified model and construction cost data from the past, we studied ( 1 ) the economic impact of new transmission line on market players ( 2 ) the possible undesirable boom and bust cycle of power plant additions under market with transmission congestion.
Simulation results show that ( 1 ) In the market with highly network congestion, the existing TO tends to build a small line and keep congestion situation in order to maintain its revenue from congestion charge. The new TO tends to build a line that provide it transmission service charge which is higher than construction cost. The optimal capacity of new ( 2 ) Deregulation may cause improper investment and results in boom and bust cycle of power plant additions. As shown in Figs. 2 and 3, the initial high price is the main driver for the investment boom. The delay in constructing keeps the price high and signals more investment. Once the construction has been completed, the price decreases sharply due to large amount of generators are in operations. The level and cycle length of boom and bust cycle depend on strategy of power plant developer.
Based on the above studies, it is found that deregulation of the electric power industry may cause social economic loss due to over capacity addition or insufficient capacity addition. * Pathom Attaviriyanupap * *
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In this research, the fundamental premises for deregulation of the electric power industry are reevaluated. The authors develop a simple model to represent wholesale electricity market with highly congested network. The model is developed by simplifying the power system and market in New York ISO based on available data of New York ISO in 2004 with some estimation. Based on the developed model and construction cost data from the past, the economic impact of transmission line addition on market participants and the impact of deregulation on power plant additions under market with transmission congestion are studied. Simulation results show that the market signals may fail to facilitate proper capacity additions and results in the undesirable over-construction and insufficient-construction cycle of capacity addition.
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